

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET**SUBJECT:** (Optional)Capitol Hill ACM Coverage for the
Intelligence Community**FROM:**

Chief. TSD/OS

EXTENSION**NO.****DATE**

22 MAR 1982

TO: (C
building)**OFFICER'S
INITIALS****COMMENTS** (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

	RECEIVED	FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. Director of Security	22 MAR 1982		
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23 MAR 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM:

Chief, Technical Security Division

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SUBJECT: Capitol Hill ACM Coverage for the
Intelligence Community

1. Based on discussions with Technical Security Division (TSD) personnel of long tenure in the Division, despite Mr. Lord's contention, CIA has never provided routine ACM coverage on Capitol Hill as a service of common concern. The closest we might have come to such an activity some years ago (not up to last year) would have involved our agreeing to provide coverage for another agency testifying at the same meeting if we happened to be on the Hill anyway for support of our own people who were testifying. This would have been done on an ad hoc basis just to be nice guys and to save our colleagues in another agency some time and energy. No one in this Division can recall even being asked by another government agency to provide coverage for Room H-140, to say nothing of refusing such a request.

2. Be that as it may, it appears that the issue of providing ACM coverage for members of the Community testifying before Congressional Committees will remain until some resolution is achieved. As we have agreed, TSD does not have the resources to support the entire Community in this manner. As you are fully aware, we cannot even do all those tasks for the Agency with which we are formally charged. If we were to be made responsible for this activity, it would not be a matter of simply adding a couple of slots to the existing T/O. Capitol Hill coverage is essentially an unprogrammed and an unprogrammable activity. Consequently, allocating resources already devoted to other activity would be a constant problem. If we were given this responsibility, there would be no way we could decline to provide coverage. Hence, either a dedicated group of personnel would have to be created or a number of personnel disproportionate to the requirement would have to be added to the T/O to insure that unalterable commitments to other activities did not leave the Division devoid of personnel to fulfill this requirement. The following are some considerations germane to this problem and some potential optional courses of action:

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a. The concept of rotating the responsibility for Capitol Hill ACM coverage among various government agencies does not appear to be practical. One would have to assume that the resources of every agency are already fully committed. Consequently, any agency tasked to provide Capitol Hill coverage would require additional resources. It would certainly seem to be more cost effective to task a single agency and provide it with adequate resources rather than supplementing the resources of several different agencies.

b. If someone insists upon levying the responsibility for Capitol Hill ACM coverage on one agency within the Community, it is suggested that this would more properly fall within the purview of the FBI rather than CIA. However, we have no reason to believe that their resource situation is any better than ours. Nonetheless, the FBI has responsibility for domestic security and if the concern is sufficiently serious, it is suggested that the FBI be given both the responsibility and the resources to carry it out.

c. The issue of charging the Capitol Hill Police (CHP) with the responsibility for this activity has been raised on a number of occasions in the past. Their limited capability in the field has always argued against this. The proposal that the Community provide the CHP training to raise their capability to a level which Community members would find satisfactory has been rejected on more than one occasion in the past on the basis that the CHP did not have a dedicated group of people to conduct this activity and we did not wish to

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d. In our original discussion on this topic, I suggested it might be appropriate to have a physical security survey done on the hearing room and recommend certain physical security features. Upon reflection and in consideration of the number of rooms involved, this approach would be an oversimplification. One of the basic precepts of an effective technical security program is maintenance of control over the environment in which conversations are held. There are so many hearing rooms and so much traffic in and out of them constantly by all sorts of personnel, including news-persons and, we understand, Soviets (KGB), that effective control under existing procedures is absolutely impossible. Again, if the concern is serious enough, the Congress ought to consider designating certain hearing rooms to be used for sensitive discussions and then instituting procedures which would result in the maintenance of effective control of those rooms. To obtain a complete understanding of the complexities of this issue, it might be appropriate to have Physical Security Division conduct a comprehensive review of all aspects of the situation on Capitol Hill. At the very least, it would seem that measures could be instituted which could deny access to Soviet and other hostile personnel.


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3. I recognize that the foregoing does not represent any clear cut answer to the problem. Frankly, we do not want the responsibility and realistically could not do it with existing resources. If I had to choose one alternative, I think I would opt to charge the Capitol Hill Police with the program.



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MEMORANDUM FOR: [redacted]

For your 8:30 meeting this morning.

*Bill - Understand you
discussed this with [redacted] March
[redacted] on the evening of 11 March
- it is trying to get more info.
- meantime - I took DDA
aside after 8:30 meeting and
alerted him we had this. I told
Harry it is misinformation - we have
not provided service of common
concern now do we
have resumes. I will
him we needed
more info
no
person*

Date 18 March 1982

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